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Abstract—For the upcoming new generation of electric power
systems, i.e. smart grids, one of the most important challenges
is to achieve an adequate economic and technical management
involving the different agents in the process.
In order to deliver the available power from suppliers to
consumers, a market-clearing mechanism is needed. At the same
time, technical operation calls for controlling that technical limits
are not reached to preserve the security of the system. In this
environment, Electric Vehicles (EVs) are gaining importance both
in economic and technical issues.
In this paper, an optimization-based approach is proposed for
clearing the market in a smart grid. The traditional participants
in energy markets are included in the formulation, stressing the
role of EVs aggregators. The results presented in this paper
illustrate the influence of EVs in the market-clearing procedure.
The benefits for the system and EVs aggregators are also studied.
Index Terms—EVs aggregator, market-clearing, optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to facilitate the integration of EVs under the con-
cept of smart grid it is interesting the development of specific
tools that allow them to participate in the market complying
with the necessary security restrictions in the system at the
same time. EVs’ incorporation in energy markets cannot be
done individually because the amount of energy they can offer
is very small compared to other agents’ offers. Therefore, their
participation makes sense under an EVs aggregator entity that
can merge the individual requirements and constraints of EVs
to submit bids to the market [1], [2].
With respect to the inclusion of an aggregator in a market
environment several approaches have been developed. An
algorithm to forecast EV demand and prices, is used to
determine optimal scheduling in [3]. Two different approaches
for allowing an aggregator agent to participate in day-ahead
markets are presented in [4] and [5], showing advantages
and drawbacks of both and supporting the optimization for-
mulation with a complete numerical analysis. Charging and
discharging of EVs are optimized in [6] where an aggregator
agent allows an EV fleet to participate in the market. Specific
algorithms are used to avoid technical problems arising from
EVs charging in [7]. The calculation of EV charging to avoid
congestion in grid lines is studied in [8]. The effects of two
scheduling models for EV charging on the day-ahead market
is analysed in [9]. In [10], authors propose a model where an
EVs aggregator can coordinate EVs charging and it can also
offer services like Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G), energy and reserve.
Finally, EV regulation services are investigated under three
different strategies in [11]. All these works and other present
in the literature show the great importance of the aggregator
role for allowing EVs to participate actively in the electricity
market.
In this paper, a market-clearing model based on optimiza-
tion, including the role of EVs aggregator, is proposed. The
objective function aims at maximizing the difference between
the price the consumers are willing to pay for their energy
and the price the suppliers offer for their production; clearing
the market and satisfying the security requirements at the
same time. Along with the traditional agents involved in a
market-clearing procedure, such as suppliers and consumers,
the effect, constraints and role of EVs’ aggregators are studied
and described. The main contribution of this paper is the
inclusion in the model of EVs’ aggregators that can bid for
buying or selling energy satisfying the mobility requirements
of the fleet they represent completing the formulation shown
in [12].
II. OPTIMIZATION-BASED APPROACH MODEL
To define the optimization problem it is necessary to take
into account the contribution of the different participants in
the process.
This problem is formulated as the maximization of the sum
of four terms:
maximize zS + zC + zB + zA
s.t. fS ≤ 0, fC ≤ 0, fB ≤ 0
fA ≤ 0, g = 0
(1)
where zS , zC , zB and zA are the functions that define the
utility for suppliers, consumers, bilateral contracts and EVs
aggregators respectively and fS , fC , fB and fA represent the
corresponding inequality constraints. Function g includes the
equations for balancing supply and demand in the grid.
For the market to take place, as shown above, four elements
have been considered:
• S, set of suppliers that submit offers for selling power
and spinning-reserve, where S = 1, 2, ..., ns.
• C, set of consumers that bid for buying power, where
C = 1, 2, ..., nc.
• B, set of bilateral agreements, where B = 1, 2, ..., nb.
• A, set of EVs aggregators, where A = 1, 2, ..., na.
The corresponding contribution to the objective function and
constraints for each participant are given next.
A. Suppliers
To participate in the market, suppliers have to submit the
power available and the power dedicated to spinning reserve,
along with their offer prices, in each time period, which typ-
ically are given in a day-ahead basis. This way, the suppliers
function zS in (1) can be written as:
zS = −
nt∑
t=1
ns∑
i=1
(µit · pit + νit · rit) (2)
where pit and r
i
t are the hourly amounts of power and spinning
-reserve put at stake and µit and ν
i
t are the corresponding
hourly offer prices, respectively, for each supplier i and time
period t in monetary units (m.u.) per MWh. The parameter nt
defines the time horizon.
Conventional generators have to conform with the following
equations regarding operation:
0 ≤ pit + rit ≤ pimax ∀i ∈ S,∀t ∈ T (3)
pit+1 − pit ≤ 4u¯i ∀i ∈ S, ∀t ∈ T (4)
pit − pit+1 ≤ 5u¯i ∀i ∈ S, ∀t ∈ T (5)
Equation (3) expresses that power output for generators can-
not be higher than the upper technical limit pimax. Equations
(4) and (5) model ramping rates limits.
The nodal power injection PSt,n for the suppliers is:
PSt,n =
∑
i∝n
pit ∀t ∈ T, ∀n ∈ N (6)
where i ∝ n defines all suppliers i connected to a bus n.
B. Consumers
Consumers participating in the market bid for demand in the
time horizon for buying the energy they need. The consumers
function zC in (1) is:
zC =
nt∑
t=1
nc∑
j=1
λjt · djt (7)
where djt is the hourly amount of dispatchable demand and λ
j
t
and is the corresponding hourly offer price, respectively, for
each consumer j and time period t.
The maximum hourly dispatchable demand is limited to a
fraction τ jt of the total demand d
j
t :
0 ≤ djt ≤ τ jt · djt ∀j ∈ C, ∀t ∈ T (8)
The nodal power demand DCt,n for the consumers at bus n
is the sum of non-dispatchable and dispatchable demand:
DCt,n =
∑
j∝n
(
(1− τ jt ) · djt + djt
)
∀t ∈ T, ∀n ∈ N (9)
Consumers bid for only the dispatchable demand, mean-
while the remainder, the inelastic demand, is included in the
power balance regardless of the price.
C. Bilateral agreements
For bilateral agreements it is necessary to establish the
schedule for the hourly amounts that are under the contract
between specific sellers and buyers:
zB =
nt∑
t=1
nb∑
b=1
(εbt · 5cbt − ϑbt · 4cbt) (10)
where the pairs (εbt ,5cbt), (ϑbt ,4cbt) define the corresponding
couple of schedule decremental and incremental, price and
energy, respectively.
The amount of energy under contract is represented by Ebt ;
the decremental and incremental constraints are given by:
0 ≤ 4cbt ≤ ϕb · Ebt (11)
0 ≤ 5cbt ≤ ϕb · Ebt (12)
where ϕb and ϕb are the fractions of the contracted energy
that the supplier is willing to sell or buy in the market.
The nodal contribution from bilateral contracts is:
PBt,n =
∑
b∝n
(Ebt +5cbt −4cbt)−
∑
b∝n
Ebt ∀t ∈ T, ∀n ∈ N
(13)
where b ∝ n and b ∝ n define the seller and buyer connection
buses to the grid and Ebt = E
b
t .
D. EVs aggregator model
Under this model EVs can act as consumers, bidding for
demand, or instead they can act as suppliers, submitting
offers and, therefore, performing V2G; bidding through an
EVs aggregator agent. It is assumed that EVs are bundled in
groups with similar movement patterns. The EVs aggregator
is responsible for satisfying the mobility requirements of the
group; it also manages V2G performance whenever necessary.
The hourly bids give the aggregator the possibility to allocate
the charging or discharging when it is more economically
beneficial. The aggregator can coordinate one or several groups
of EVs located in different buses of the grid.
The EV contribution is determined through the EV pattern,
that is, the time periods when EVs are available in a particular
node for charging or discharging, and the time periods when
they are travelling. Assuming that a group of EVs cannot sell
and buy energy in the same time period, the clearing market
procedure will give, on the one hand, the allocation of the EV
charging that meet the requirements regarding mobility and,
on the other hand, the EV discharging.
The aggregator function zA is expressed in the following
way:
zA =
nt∑
t=1
na∑
a=1
(βat · pc,at − αat · pd,at ) (14)
where pd,at and p
c,a
t are the discharging power offered and the
charging power required for EVs belonging to an aggregator
a, respectively; and αat and β
a
t are the corresponding offer
prices.
Note that variables pc,at and p
d,a
t represent the total hourly
charging and discharging power for a group g of nga EVs,
belonging to an aggregator a, with identical movement pattern.
Parameters βat and α
a
t can depend on the bus where EVs are
connected and are also the instruments to control the charging
and discharging. As it will be stated later, a group of EVs
will behave in the same way, that is, they all will charge or
discharge at the same time. EVs in the same node can be also
included in different groups.
The constraints considered regarding the maximum charging
and discharging power are:
0 ≤ pc,at ≤ Pmaxn · nga ∀a ∈ A,∀t ∈ T, ∀n ∈ N (15)
0 ≤ pd,at ≤ Pmaxn · nga ∀a ∈ A,∀t ∈ T, ∀n ∈ N (16)
where Pmaxn is the nodal rate power.
The nodal contribution of EVs is expressed as:
PAt,n =
∑
a∝n
(pd,at − pc,at ) ∀t ∈ T, ∀n ∈ N (17)
The battery State of Charge (SOC) Sat for one EV in a
group g has to comply with the following constraints:
Sat+1 =S
a
t + ηc ·
pc,at
nga
− (1/ηd) · p
d,a
t
nga
− Cat
∀a ∈ A,∀t ∈ T
(18)
Samin ≤ Sat ≤ Samax ∀a ∈ A,∀t ∈ T (19)
Sat = S
a
max if t = t
∗ ∀a ∈ A (20)
Sati ≤ Satf ∀a ∈ A (21)
Equation (18) guarantees the transition of the SOC Sat ac-
cording to the EV charging, EV discharging and consumption
due to mobility Cat in the current time period through the
corresponding charging, and discharging efficiencies, ηC , ηD.
Note that pc,at /n
g
a and p
d,a
t /n
g
a are the absorbed and drawn
power for a single EV respectively. Equation (19) limits the
maximum and minimum value for the SOC in Samax and S
a
min.
Finally, (20) forces the maximum value for the SOC in time
period t∗, early morning, and (21) establishes that the final
SOC has to be higher or equal to the initial SOC.
E. Grid model
Regarding security constrains a DC power flow model has
been adopted:
P tm,n = Bm,n · (θmt − θnt ) ∀m,n ∈ N, ∀t ∈ T,m 6= n (22)
where P tm,n is the active power flow in the line m−n, Bm,n
is the line susceptance and θm, θn are the phase angles.
The limits for active power flow are defined by:
−Pmaxm,n ≤ P tm,n ≤ Pmaxm,n ∀m,n ∈ N, ∀t ∈ T,m 6= n (23)
The power balance in every bus of the grid is guaranteed with:
PSt,n + P
B
t,n + P
A
t,n +
∑
m≺n
P tm,n = D
C
t,n +
∑
m≺n
PL,tm,n
∀n ∈ N, ∀t ∈ T,m 6= n
(24)
where m ≺ n defines all the m buses connected to n. Note
that PL,tm,n allocates 50 % of the losses in line m− n to node
n and it is computed through a quadratic model:
PL,tm,n = Bm,n · (θmt −θnt )2 ∀m,n ∈ N, ∀t ∈ T,m 6= n (25)
III. CASE STUDY
The case study network is based on the data and character-
istics for the IEEE-RTS 24-bus system [13], composed of 38
lines, 10 generating units, 14 consumption units, 2 bilateral
contracts and 15 buses with EVs, Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. 24-bus system
The technical data for each generator, namely the maximum
power output and ramps rates, are given in Table I.
TABLE I
TECHNICAL DATA FOR GENERATING UNITS
Bus pmax (MW) 4u¯ (MW) 5u¯ (MW)
1 100 50 50
2 100 50 50
7 76 40 40
13 76 40 40
14 20 5 5
15 76 40 40
16 76 40 40
18 20 10 10
21 20 20 20
22 20 7 7
The model is solved for a 24 hour horizon. The load for
three representative consumers, located in buses 6, 14 and 18,
is given in Fig. 2. For the rest of the consumers the trend is
similar with significant loads towards the end of the day. The
amount of dispatchable demand depends on the time period
but it is around 12 % for all the consumers.
Fig. 2. Hourly consumers load
Regarding the bilateral contracts, the energy selling and
purchase bids are 8, 9 and 4, 3, in m.u./MWh, respectively
for both. The amount of energy the supplier is willing to sell
or buy in the market is assumed to be 20% for both contracts.
The volume of energy contracted is different for every time
period and it is between 10 MW and 30 MW.
Finally, 7800 EVs have been considered in the system, this
roughly constitutes 5 % of the system power capacity. The
EVs have been distributed into 30 groups of 260 EVs each and
with 2 groups in each bus. It is assumed that all the EVs have
the same characteristics, the maximum and minimum battery
level are 16.5 kWh and 1.65 kWh respectively. A value of
3.7 kW has been chosen for the maximum EV charging and
discharging meanwhile, the corresponding efficiencies, ηC and
ηD, are 0.95 and 0.98.
It is considered that each EV performs two journeys a
day. The outward journey takes place in the early morning
and the return journey in the afternoon, or evening. Fig. 3
gives the hourly configuration of the journeys and the total
consumption in MWh for all the EVs. It is also assumed that
EVs are attached to a particular bus in the system, that is, when
EVs move, connection points at the origin and destination are
linked to the same transmission grid bus. Note that the battery
consumption represented in Fig. 3 takes place when EVs are
moving; this is not a load for the grid.
Fig. 3. EV battery consumption in trips
The hourly offer prices for suppliers were adapted from
generation costs given in [13] depending on the different
production technologies. The bidding prices for dispatchable
demand are calibrated to provide illustrative results. Finally,
EVs offer prices were chosen to represent realistic situations.
IV. RESULTS
In this section, the most relevant results of applying the
proposed model to the described system are presented.
One of the most important results of the clearing market
model is the nodal price. In practice, nodal prices determine,
for example, the dispatch of generators and demand. In this
work, it is assumed that the system capacity is high enough so
no congestion in lines takes place. Thus, nodal prices, although
different because of losses, are very close. Fig 4 shows the
price for bus 1.
Fig. 4. Hourly nodal price for bus 1
As an example, the hourly generation level for three rep-
resentative generators is shown in Fig. 5. The production is
higher at the end of the day when the demand is increased,
starting-up the most expensive generators. On the other hand,
the most inexpensive generators are running the whole day.
Fig. 5. Hourly generation level
Some results for bilateral contracts are given in Table II.
For contract 2, the supplier buys energy from the market in the
early time periods due to the market price being lower than the
limit established in the contract. However, for both contracts
the suppliers sell energy to the market in the intermediate time
periods due to the market price being higher than the limit
established in the contract.
Finally, the total EVs charging and discharging is shown in
Fig. 6. The EVs aggregator takes advantage of low purchase
prices, for EVs charging, biding high in the early time periods
TABLE II
BILATERAL CONTRACTS RESULTS
Bilateral contract 1
Period Market price εbt ϑbt Agreement
4 3.68 4 8 Buy 2.0 MWh
14 9.79 4 8 Sell 3.0 MWh
Bilateral contract 2
19 12.57 3 9 Sell 4.5 MWh
and at the end of the day. However, the EVs aggregator bids
high at demand peaks to get additional benefits.
Fig. 6. EVs total charging/discharging
The EVs aggregator’s offer mechanism allows for benefits
for the grid so the EVs charging is used to fill valleys
meanwhile the EVs discharging is used for peak shaving. Fig.
7 shows the demand curves for two different penetration levels.
Fig. 7. Demand curves with EVs for two penetration levels
The economical benefits can be assessed through an average
price pim defined as:
pim =
24∑
t=1
24∑
n=1
(pibt,n · Ebt,n − pist,n · Est,n)
(Ebt,n − Est,n)
(26)
where pibt,n and pi
s
t,n are the buying and selling nodal prices
and Ebt,n and E
s
t,n the corresponding amounts of energy,
respectively.
For the presented case study a value of 1.01 m.u./MWh was
obtained for pim; this value can be compared with a different
simulation for which V2G was not permitted and the resulting
pim was 4.19.
V. CONCLUSION
An optimization-based model for market-clearing, under a
single operator management, has been presented. It incorpo-
rates the common participants in energy markets along with
an upcoming entity in smart grids, the EVs aggregator.
It has been shown that depending on EVs aggregator’s
offer mechanism both the aggregator and the system can get
benefits. The EVs aggregator can get lower prices for EVs
charging and higher income through V2G, also satisfying the
mobility requirements. A better final demand curve can be
obtained as well, allowing the system to work more efficiently.
The effect of EVs pattern uncertainties and congestion in
the market are proposed as future work.
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